Within the framework of any bilevel decision problem, a leader's decision is influenced by the reaction of his or her follower. When multiple followers who may have had a share in decision variables, objectives and constraints are involved in a bilevel decision problem, the leader's decision will be affected, not only by the reactions of these followers, but also by the relationships among these followers. This paper firstly identifies nine different kinds of relationships (S 1 to S 9 ) amongst followers by establishing a framework for bilevel multifollower decision problems. For each of the nine a corresponding bilevel multi-follower decision model is then developed. Also, this paper particularly proposes related theories focusing on an uncooperative decision problem (i.e., S 1 model), as this model is the most basic one for bilevel multi-follower decision problems over the nine kinds of relationships.
Introduction
Bilevel decision (also called bilevel programming or bilevel optimization) techniques are mainly developed for solving decentralized management problems with decision makers in an hierarchical organization. A decision maker at the upper level is known as the leader, and at the lower level, the follower [6, 7] . Each decision maker (leader or follower) tries to optimize his/her own objective function with or without considering the objective of the other level, but the decision of each level affects the objective optimization of the other level [4] . Therefore, the leader may be able to influence the behavior of the follower without completely controlling the follower's action. At the same time the leader may be simultaneously affected by the follower's behavior. An hierarchical optimization structure appears naturally in many aspects of resource planning, management and policy making, including water resource management, financial planning, land-use planning, production planning (coordination of multi-divisional firms, network facility location), and transportation planning (network design, trip demand estimation). Amouzegar and Moshirvaziri [1] , Bard [4] and Labbe et al. [8] have already recognized the need to consider these planning problems from a bilevel or multi-level modeling point of view.
In general, there are two fundamental issues in both bilevel decision theory and practice.
One is how to model a real-world bilevel decision problem that may have various situations at the two decision levels, and the other is how to find an optimal solution for the decision problem. A number of researchers (e.g., [3, 7, 9] ) have established original forms of optimality conditions for bilevel programming. A number of bilevel decision approaches and algorithms [2, 4, 5] have been proposed to find an optimal solution. This includes the most successful Kuhn-Tucker approach [4] . Although much research has been carried out in this area, the existing bilevel technology has been mainly focused on a specific situation comprising one leader and one follower. However, in the case of a real-world bilevel decision problem, the lower level of a bilevel decision may involve multiple decision units.
The leader's decision is therefore affected by the objectives and strategies of the multiple followers. For each possible decision of the leader, those followers may have their own, different, reactions. The relationships between these multiple followers can be various.
They may or may not share their decision variables. They may have individual objectives and constraints, but work with others cooperatively, or may have common objectives or common constraints. For example, as a leader, the Government's objective in land-use planning is to maximize profiles by establishing some suitable agricultural development policies. Multiple agricultural groups, involving farmers, conservationists, Aboriginal groups, and regions will affect the Government's policy-making in land-use. Each model is the most popular and the most basic situation for BLMF decision problems. This paper thus presents a definition of an optimal solution and related theories for the S 1 model.
It further extends the Kuhn-Tucker approach for solving the S 1 model with a real case-study of a road network problem. Related approaches for solving other eight situation models within this framework will be explored further in a separate research paper. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the framework for BLMF decision problems is proposed. Related theories focusing on the uncooperative (S 1 ) model of BLMF decision problems are given in Section 3. An extended Kuhn-Tuck approach for solving the S 1 model is presented in Section 4. A real-case example of a road-network problem for the extended Kuhn-Tucker approach is illustrated in Section 5. Discussions, further remarks, and future research plans are concluded in Section 6.
A Framework for Bilevel Multi-follower Decision Problems
Different reactions could be generated at the lower level towards each possible action conducted at the upper level when multiple followers are involved in a bilevel decisionmaking. Moreover, different relationships among these followers could cause multiple different processes for deriving an optimal solution for the upper level's decision-making. Therefore, the leader's decision will be affected, not only by the reactions of these followers, but also by the relationships among these followers. Basically, there are three different kinds of relationships among the followers determined by the form of a share in decision variables, the first relationship factor. The first kind of these relationships is the uncooperative situation where there is no sharing of decision variables among the followers. In such a situation, there are obviously neither shared objectives nor shared constraints among the followers. The second case is the cooperative situation where the followers totally share the decision variables in their objectives and constraints. However, there are several different sub-cases within the cooperative situation which are determined by the relationships among the objectives (the second relationship factor) and constrains (the third relationship factors) of the followers. Each follower may have an individual objective whatever sharing their constraints with other followers. For example, one agricultural group has its objective to maximize its profile of agriculture, and another agricultural group's objective is to maximize its land sustainability, towards the Government's policy in land-use. The two followers share all other decision variables, but have different objectives. Another pair of sub-cases is that the followers have their common objectives whatever sharing their constraints. For example, for any governmental agricultural policy, the two agriculture groups have their common objective to maximize its profile of agriculture. But they may or may not share constraints in financial, environment protection, and cultural in the context of attempting to achieve an optimal solution. The last case is the partial cooperative situation where the followers partially share decision variables in their objectives or constraints or both. Similar to the second case, four subcases are involved within this one as well.
Based on the three cases and their various sub-cases determined by the three relationship factors, decision variables, objectives and constraints, totally nine different kinds of situations among the followers are identified, named S 1 , S 2 ,…, S 9 . A framework is established to describe these situations in Table 1 . For a bilevel decision problem, if some followers share their decision variables or some not, it will be dealt with as a variable sharing situation. Similar, if some followers share their objective (or constraint) functions or some not, it will be dealt with as an objective (or constraint) sharing situation. Each situation shown in the framework will require a specific BLMF decision model for describing it, and a specific approach for deriving an optimal solution for the leader's decision. Based on the basic linear bilevel decision problem model [6, 7] , the decision model of the nine specific situations are established and described respectively as follows. ,
for each value of x, is the solution of the lower level problem:
where
S 2 Model for BLMF decision problems
For and a linear BLMF decision problem in which K followers are involved and there are shared decision variables, objective functions and constraint functions among them is defined as follows.
,
S 3 Model for BLMF decision problems
For and a linear BLMF decision problem in which K followers are involved and there are shared decision variables and objective functions but separate constraint functions among them is defined as follows.
It consists of finding a solution to the upper level problem
S 4 Model for BLMF decision problems
For and a linear BLMF decision problem in which K followers are involved and there are shared decision variables and constraint functions but separate objective functions among them is defined as follows.
, for each value of x, is the solution of the lower level problem:
S 5 Model for BLMF decision problems
For and a linear BLMF decision problem in which K followers are involved and there are shared decision variables but separate objective and constraint functions among them is defined as follows.
for each value of x, is the solution of the lower level problem: 
and z, for each value of x, are the solution of the lower level problem:
S 7 Model for BLMF decision problems
For and 
S 8 Model for BLMF decision problems
S 9 Model for BLMF decision problems
The nine BLMF decision models define respectively the nine kinds of relationships among the followers described in the framework of BLMF decision problem. Obviously, these models will require their individual definitions for an optimal solution. Therefore, different approaches to derive an optimal solution for these models need to be developed. In particular, there are obvious differences between the uncooperative decision model (S 1 ) of which there are no shared decision variables and cooperative model (S 2 -S 5 ) of which there are shared decision variables among the followers. In an uncooperative decision situation, the followers' reactions for each possible action of the leader can be determined by considering multiple individual optimizations respectively. While in a cooperative situation, the followers' reactions will be determined by dealing with a multi-objective optimization problem put forward by all the followers.
However, for any of the nine models, it is assumed that the leader knows completely the objective functions and constraints of these followers and the relationships among these objective and constraint functions. The control for decision variables is partitioned between the leader and the followers. Both the leader and the followers seek to minimize their individual payoff objective functions. The leader must anticipate all possible responses of followers based on their relationships.
An optimal Solution for the Uncooperative Bilevel Multi-follower Decision Problem
The uncooperative situation (S 1 ) is the most basic form for BLMF decision problems over the nine kinds of decision models. This section, therefore, focuses on this model by giving the definition for an optimal solution and related theorems for solving the S 1 decision model. 
Definition 2
(a) Constraint region of a linear BLMF programming problem:
The linear BLFMP problem constraint region refers to all possible combinations of choices that the leader and followers may make.
(b) Projection of onto the leader's decision space:
Unlike the rules in an uncooperative game theory of which each player must choose a strategy simultaneously, the definition of the BLMF model requires that the leader move first by selecting an x in attempt to minimize his/her objective subjecting to constraints of both upper and each lower level.
(c) Feasible set for each follower :
The feasible region for the follower is affected by the leader's choice of , x and allowable choices of each follower are the elements of . S (d) Each follower's rational reaction set for :
The followers observe the leader's action and simultaneously react by selecting from his/her feasible set to minimize his/her objective function. 
Thus in terms of the above notations, the linear BLMF problem can be written as
We present the following theorem to characterize the condition under which there is an optimal solution for a linear BLMF problem. 
by Definition 2e. Because we are minimizing a linear function over which is nonempty and bounded, an optimal solution to the linear BLMF problem must exist. The proof is completed.
An Extended Kuhn-Tucker Approach for the Uncooperative Bilevel Multifollower Decision Problem
The fundamental idea to deal with the uncooperative BLMF decision problems is that it replaces each follower's problem with its Kuhn-Tucker conditions and appends the resultant system to the leader's problem. The reformulation of the linear BLMF problem is a standard mathematical program and relatively easy to solve because all but complementary constraints are linear. Omitting or relaxing the constraints leaves a standard linear program that can be solved by using a simplex method [4] . In an uncooperative situation, the leader will be required to first select an in attempting to minimize his/her objective subject to constraints of both the upper and each follower at the lower level. It then defines each follower's rational reaction set simultaneously by selecting the individual variable from his/her feasible set to minimize his/her objective function for the leader's choice. The Kuhn-Tucker approach is the most popular one for solving one leader one follower bilevel decision problems. Based on the definition of an optimal solution [11] , an extended Kuhn-Tucker approach for the uncooperative BLMF decision problem is proven and described as follows. 
Proof: See (Bard 1998, PP. 59-60) Let and ) ,
be the dual variables associated with
respectively. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 A necessary and sufficient condition that ( solves the linear BLMF problem 1a is that there exist (row) vectors , and such that ( solve:
1). Let us get an explicit expression of (2).
Rewrite (2) as follows:
where i by Definition 2d. We rewrite it as: , , , 2 ,
by Definition 2c. Consequently, we can have , , , 2 ,
where i by Definition 2a. , , , 2 ,
This simple transformation has shown that to solve the linear BLMF programming (1a) is equivalent to solve the problem (4a-f).
2). Necessity is obvious from (4a-f).
3). Sufficiency.
If (
is an optimal solution of (1a), we need to show that there exist (row) vectors and w such that solve (3a-f). Going one step further, we only need to prove that there exist (row) vectors u v and such that satisfies the following conditions ) , , ,
and they are not negative variables.
Because ( is an optimal solution of (1a), we have ) , , by Definition 2e. Consequently, is an optimal solution to the following problem:
where i by Definition 2d. Rewrite (6) as follows , , , 2 ,
To simplify (7a-f), we can have
where i Thus simplifying (8a-f), we can have . , , 2 ,
Now we see that is an optimal solution of (9a-c) which is a LP problem. By Proposition 
Theorem 2 indicates that the most direct approach for solving (1a) is to solve the equivalent mathematical program given in (3a-f). One of its advantages is that it allows a more robust model to be solved without introducing any new computational difficulties.
A Real Case Study of a Road-Network Problem
In general, BLMF decision actions have the following three features: (1) there exists decision units within a predominantly hierarchical structure; (2) corresponding BLMF decision model has been proposed. In particular, this paper has proposed related theories focusing on the uncooperative BLMF decision model (S 1 ). An extended Kuhn-Tucker approach for solving the specific kind of BLMF decision problems is then developed. Finally, a real-case study of a road-network problem illustrates the application of the proposed BLMF decision technique. Further study will involve the development of approaches for the other eight BLMF models (S 2 to S 9 ) as described in the proposed framework. A decision support system will then need to be developed to implement the proposed techniques for solving all the nine kinds of BLMF decision problems.
